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Highly subsidised public schools are the principal provider of education in the rural areas 
of Pakistan. Steady growth of school age population over time coupled with stagnant public 
funding has put enormous pressure on this system. The alternative of cost recovery through 
user charges has its own critics. They argue that introduction of tuition fees would substantially 
reduce the already small representation of low-income households in primary schools due to 
high price elasticity of their demand for schooling. Moreover, the revenue-generating potential 
of this policy may also be limited due to same reason. The present study uses a discrete choice 
random utility model of household utility maximising behaviour to evaluate feasibility and 
consequences of introducing user fees in primary schools in rural Pakistan, particularly with 
reference to above criticisms. The demand function for school enrolment derived from this 
model allows us to test the hypothesis that price elasticity of demand for schooling varies with 
income. It also provides estimates of the parameters of the utility function needed for 
measuring parents’ willingness to pay for their childrens’ education if money generated from 
tuition fees is reinvested in education. The estimated demand function takes into account total 
price of education, including opportunity cost. Estimation results show that price elasticity of 
demand for school enrolment is higher for lower-income groups. Hence school enrolment of 
the poorest children would bear the main brunt of user fees policy. Children’s gender and age, 
father’s education, presence of T.V. in the household, and community variables like the 
presence of an elected district council member, electricity, and public transport in the village 
turn out to be significant influences on the probability of primary school enrolment. 
Willingness to pay for education is lower for poorer households and can generate revenues to 
cover only a fraction of the cost of running a school. Hence the need to search for other sources 
of financing primary education in rural Pakistan. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Highly subsidised public schools are the principal provider of education in 
Pakistan, particularly in its rural areas. Economic woes of the government and a 
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steady growth in school age population have landed this system into serious 
financial problems. Its conformity to the moral principles of equity and social 
justice has also been disputed on the grounds that free education is financed by 
regressive taxation and access to most heavily subsidised educational services is 
positively related to household income.1 Moreover, it is argued that benefits of 
free education do not reach the children from the poorest households, as most of 
them stay away from school due to the high opportunity cost and low perceived 
benefits of education. 
The alternative of charging fees for the educational services of public schools 
to make them financially viable has its own critics. They claim that the introduction 
of tuition fees would substantially reduce the already small representation of low-
income households in the primary schools because their price elasticity of demand 
for schooling is quite high. They further argue that given a strong positive 
relationship between education and earnings, the lower enrolment rate for the poor 
households today would translate into more income inequality and poverty 
tomorrow. Doubts have also been raised about the revenue-generating potential of 
user fees on the presumption of high price elasticity. 
A simple though not so rigorous method of assessing the validity of the 
foregoing critique is to estimate an ad hoc demand function for education that allows 
price elasticity to vary with income, and to look at the estimates of income group-
specific price elasticities of demand for school enrolment. This approach, however, 
suffers from theoretical as well as empirical shortcomings. From the theoretical point 
of view, it does not ensure compatibility of the estimated demand function with the 
principle of utility maximisation, which lies at the core of the consumer theory. 
Empirically, it completely ignores the benefits of investing the revenues generated 
by cost recovery, through tuition fees going back in the education system, as 
envisaged by the proponents of this policy. 
A full appreciation of the potential and consequences of instituting user fees 
for education requires broadening the scope of the analysis—to include issues such 
as how much a household will be willing to pay for education of children if 
additional educational services like a new school in the neighbourhood are made 
available to it. By estimating parents’ willingness to pay for their children’s 
education for different income groups, we can find out the maximum amount of 
tuition that can be charged without reducing income group-specific enrolment rates. 
This is a worthwhile measure for devising a scheme of user charges for education as 
well as for appraising the feasibility of involving private investors and NGOs in this 
sector; and it is based on the principal of utility maximisation. 
 
1The incidence pattern of federal taxes across various income groups is generally regressive in the 
rural areas of Pakistan. See Malik and Saqib (1985, 1989).  
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In the following section we present a model of the willingness to pay for 
education, with a brief background. Data and variables used in this study are 
discussed in Section III. Section IV consists of estimation results and their analysis. 
Income class-specific price elasticities, measures of willingness to pay for school 
enrolment, and their policy implications are the focus of Section V. Some 
concluding observations are made in the final section. 
 
II. MODELLING WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR EDUCATION 
 
Background 
A quick sampling of the studies of the willingness to pay in the economics 
literature reveals that they often focus on the commodities which are different in one 
way or the other from the commonly marketed items.2 While many aspects of the 
traditional economic theory carry through to these situations, some adjustments need 
to be made to take into account the unique characteristics of the goods and services 
under consideration. Three such characteristics that must be taken into account while 
formulating a model of the willingness to pay for education in rural Pakistan are the 
fact that education in most of the rural Pakistan is provided at zero or a small fixed 
price, discrete nature of the decision to attend school, and the likelihood that the 
effects of introducing price into the system will vary with income. 
When price of a commodity or service exhibits no variation across units of 
observation, econometric estimation of the coefficient of price variable in its demand 
function is not possible. Adjusting price variable to incorporate other associated 
expenses that show considerable variation such as travel and opportunity costs can 
solve this problem. An excellent application of this approach can be found in the 
travel cost models of recreation demand.3 Insights from these models can be readily 
utilised for modelling willingness to pay for education in rural Pakistan, as attending 
school there almost always involves some travel. Opportunity cost of time spent in 
school is also very high in Pakistan, partly due to the presence of child labour. In 
 
2Some examples are the studies of the willingness to pay for recreational services of public parks 
[Abala (1987)], housing characteristics [Gross (1988)], medical care [Gertler and Gaag (1990)], attributes 
of lamb loin chops [Mullen and Wohlgenant (1991)], air quality [Farber and Rambaldi (1993)], and 
underground transport safety [Jones-Lee and Loomes (1994)]. 
3The pioneering research that develops or uses the travel cost model includes studies by Wood 
and Trice (1958), Clawson (1959), Clawson and Knetsch (1966), and Cesario (1976). A discussion of the 
major issues related to the theory and estimation of this class of models can be found in Bockstael, et al. 
(1991). 
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fact its omission from the demand function would most likely lead to biased 
estimates of the coefficients.4 
Parents’ decision to enrol their children in school or not is dichotomous in 
nature. McFadden’s (1974) random utility model (RUM), which is based on 
consumer’s utility maximising behaviour, provides a framework for econometric 
modelling of this kind of choice. The demand function derived from this model can 
be estimated by using one of the limited-dependent variable techniques.5 Resulting 
parameter estimates can then be used to calculate willingness to pay. 
Variability of the price response with income has a strong bearing on the 
shape of the utility function, which in turn determines functional form of the demand 
function. This issue will be taken up later. 
There are only a few published papers that combine the above-mentioned 
ingredients of a model of the willingness to pay for education into a finished product 
and put it to use, though the need for undertaking such an exercise has long been 
explicitly or implicitly acknowledged.6 Haveman and Wolfe (1984) propose a 
procedure for estimating a willingness-to-pay measure for non-market effects of 
education and offer some illustrative estimates. This, however, is not a promising 
strategy for measuring willingness-to-pay for education as a whole. Jimenez and 
Tan’s (1985) estimates for Pakistan are based on hypothetical values and informed 
guesses for various parameters, so that much reliance cannot be placed on them. 
Two separate papers by Gertler and Glewwe (1990, 1992) successfully synthesise 
the above-mentioned ingredients into a viable methodology for measuring 
willingness to pay for education and apply it to rural Peru. Alderman, et al. (2001) 
use a similar methodology for Pakistan, but their data coverage is limited to the low- 
and middle-income areas of a single city, and their estimates do not take into account 
opportunity cost as well as several household and community variables that are 
known to play a significant role in the demand for education. 
We present here a slightly modified version of the Gertler-Glewwe model and 
use it to estimate willingness-to-pay for primary education in rural Pakistan. 
Wherever necessary, we use our own interpretation of the model. 
 
The Model 
Consider a household having a utility function, which depends on a composite 
good Z1 and education Z2. Let us write this utility function as: 
 
4See Bockstael, et al. (1991), p. 243.  
5Maddala (1983) discusses these techniques in detail and also provides references to the studies 
that have used them. Also see Greene (1993). 
6See, e.g., Psacharopoulos, et al. (1986) and Khan, et al. (1984, 1986a).  
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ns,=i     +Z,ZV=U iiii ε)( 21  … … … … (1) 
where subscripts s and n refer to the school and no school options respectively, and ε 
is an independently and identically distributed stochastic term which can be 
interpreted as a random taste shifter or as the error that would be made in estimating 
utility which is known to the decision-maker with certainty. The two interpretations 
are functionally similar. 
The household combines purchased and non-purchased inputs through a 
household production function to produce the output of educational process, Z2. In 
symbols: 
)(22 XZ=Z  … … … … … … (2) 
where X is a vector of above-mentioned inputs. 
The concept of household production function is central to the ‘New 
Theory of Consumption’ associated with the names of Becker (1965); Lancaster 
(1966) and Muth (1966). The basic idea behind this theory is that households do 
not get direct utility from the goods and services sold in the market. Instead, they 
convert them into utility-bearing commodities, activities, and characteristics using 
the household production process.7 Later work by Bradford, et al. (1969); Oates 
(1977, 1981) and Hamilton (1983) recognises the role of non-purchased inputs 
like community environment and ‘quality’ of its residents in the production of 
local public services such as public safety and education, and hence furnishes 
theoretical justification for the inclusion of community variables in the production 
function for education. 
Measuring output of the educational process is considered as one of the most 
troublesome jobs in the applied work on education. Traditionally, scores on various 
standardised tests are used as proxy, but it is generally agreed that they do not 
accurately represent the product parents demand.8 Fortunately, in the present 
context, there is a way around this problem. By substituting (2) into the utility 
function (1) it can be rewritten as: 
εiiii +XZ,ZV=U ))(( 21  … … … … … (3) 
Now utility is a function of the composite good Z1 and the vector of inputs X in the 
educational production function rather than the output Z2. The demand function for 
 
7For an overview of the home production approach and a survey of related literature see Gronal 
(1986). 
8Some of the issues related to the measurement of the output of education are discussed by 
Griliches (1977); Michael (1982); Haveman and Wolfe (1984) and Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992).  
Najam us Saqib 32 
education derived from (3) would treat education as “whatever parents think it is”.9 
This is an advantage over structurally estimating the educational production 
function. 
If parents decide to send their child to school, the utility will be: 
εssss +XZ,ZV=U ))(( 21  … … … … … (4) 
The utility associated with the no schooling option will be: 
εnnnn +ZV=U )( 1  … … … … … … (5) 
The budget constraint faced by the household may be written as: 
Y=Z=P+Z ns 11  … … … … … (6) 
where P is the price of education including the price of child’s foregone time, and Y 
is household income. We can use this budget constraint to substitute out Z1s and Z1n 
from the utility function, hence expressing utility as a function of P, Y, and X. 
The household will choose to send a child to school if the utility obtained 
from this choice is greater than the utility level which would be attained if the child 
was not enrolled in a school, i.e., when Us>Un. Hence: 
))((
))((
0)(
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Where η=εs–εn. Assuming that the probability distribution of η is symmetric (like 
normal or logistic), we may write: 
)()( VVF=EnrolmentPr ns −  … … … … … (8) 
where F is the cumulative density function of η evaluated at Vs–Vn. 
A necessary and sufficient condition for η to have the logistic distribution is 
that εs and εn are independently and identically distributed with type I extreme value 
distribution.10 Thus with this assumption about εs and εn, a binary logit model can be 
used to estimate (8).11 It leads to the following expression for the probability of 
going to school, denoted here by πs: 
 
9Hamilton and Macauley (1991). 
10See McFadden (1974) and Pudney (1989), pp.116–118, and Appendix 1. 
11Logistic distribution provides a close approximation to the normal distribution over much of its 
range and, unlike normal distribution, has simple closed-form expressions for its c.d.f. and p.d.f. Logit 
model is widely used in empirical research so that the results obtained by using this model are directly 
… … … … … (7) 
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The probability πn of not going to school can be determined residually as 
1–πs using the result that the sum of the probabilities of all possible outcomes is 
unity. 
The expression (9) is interpreted as the demand function for schooling. By 
comparing it with the general functional form of the logit demand function eXß/1+eXß 
(where X is a vector of explanatory variables), it can be seen that in our model, the 
shape of the demand function depends on utility difference Vs–Vn. This demand 
function can be estimated using the maximum likelihood technique, and the resulting 
estimates of the parameters of the utility function can be used to compute willingness 
to pay for availability of school as measured by compensating variation (CV).12 For 
logit model, compensating variation is given by: 
)]()([1 e+elne+eln=CV VVVV nsns −λ  … … … … (10) 
where λ is the marginal utility of money and V’s and V ’s represent value of V 
before and after the change respectively.13 
The functional form of the utility function (3) must be explicitly specified for 
empirical estimation of the above model because, as noted above, the shape of the 
demand function for education depends on the utility difference Vs–Vn. Inputs in the 
educational production function also enter into the demand function through the 
utility function. A linear utility function is not suitable in this context, because any 
variable that does not change over the alternatives available to the decision-maker 
will drop out of the utility difference and hence out of the demand function.14 
This problem can be fixed for the variables like personal, family, and 
community characteristics that constitute vector X by simply assuming alternative-
specific constants for them. However, this strategy does not work for the composite 
                                                 
comparable to the findings of earlier researchers. 
12Compensating variation is defined as “the amount of money an economic unit would be willing 
to pay in order to receive a benefit” [Moffat (1983)], and can serve as a good monetary measure of 
parents’ willingness to pay for benefits like a nearby school. CV is more appealing as compared to other 
measures of welfare change for at least two reasons. One, it possesses certain desirable properties 
[Mohring (1971)], and two, it is conceptually closer to the magnitude (i.e., parents’ willingness to pay for 
certain benefits) in which we are interested. 
13See Small and Rosen (1981). Other contributors to the literature on welfare measurement in 
discrete choice models include McFadden (1974) and Hanemann (1984). 
14For a discussion of this issue, see, e.g., Hanemann (1984); Train (1986) and Hoffman and 
Duncan (1988). 
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consumption good Z1 because it would imply that same amount of consumption 
would yield different levels of utility, depending on whether parents have enrolled 
their child in a school or not. This doesn’t seem to make a lot of sense.15  
A utility function that is quadratic in consumption and linear in the 
components of vector X avoids the above-mentioned problems. Assuming this 
functional form, making use of the budget constraint (6) to substitute out Z1s and Z1n, 
and employing the relationship: 
wH+P=P *  … … … … … … (11) 
where P is total price of education, P* is out-of-pocket cost of education, w is the 
wage rate, and H stands for number of hours of work foregone due to schooling, we 
can rewrite Equation (4) representing utility associated with schooling option and 
Equation (5) corresponding to the utility from no-schooling option as: 
εγγ−−α−−α s**s +X++wHPY+wHPY=U 10221 )()(  … (12) 
and 
εαα nn +Y+Y=U 221  … … … … … (13) 
respectively. The difference between the non-stochastic parts of the above utility 
expressions may be written as: 
)]()[()( 22110 wH+P2YwH+P+wH+PX+=VV
***
ns −αα−γγ−    … (14) 
A comparison of the utility difference Equation (14) and the logit demand 
function (9) shows that the demand for schooling in the present model is a function 
of the price of schooling (including opportunity cost), a complex price-income 
interaction term, and the variables in vector X. 
 
III.  DATA AND VARIABLES 
Data used in this study were taken from the 10th round of the multi-purpose 
longitudinal survey of rural Pakistan conducted by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) between December 1988 and February 1989. It covered 
more than 750 households comprising over 7,000 individuals selected through 
stratified random sampling from the villages in two districts of the Punjab, namely, 
Faisalabad and Attock, and one district each in the remaining three provinces, i.e., 
Dir in the North West Frontier Province, Badin in Sindh, and Kalat in Balochistan.16 
 
15For more detail on this issue, see Akin, et al. (1986); Gertler, et al. (1987) and Gertler and Gaag 
(1990). 
16Kalat was later dropped from the survey primarily because of logistic difficulties. The province 
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Data from the human capital modules of the survey, which were administered only 
during the 10th round, were extensively used in this study, while additional 
information from other modules was also added to this core data.17 Extensive weekly 
recall information on the work activities of the surveyed individuals is a 
distinguishing feature of this data set that allows for estimating the opportunity cost 
of education, and hence makes it particularly suitable for the present study. Most 
existing data sets for Pakistan do not match the IFPRI survey data in this respect. 
Our working sample consists of all the individuals included in the human 
capital module of the IFPRI survey who were in the ‘primary school-going age’, 
whether actually enrolled in a school or not. The term ‘primary school-going age’ 
needs elaboration. In Pakistan, official documents consider everyone between the 
ages of five and nine years a member of this age group, though many believe that 
given the prevalence of late school entry and grade repetition, these age limits are 
too narrow.18 
This issue can be decided by a careful examination of the age profile of the 
primary school students. Figure 1, which is based on the IFPRI data, presents 
percentage age distribution of the persons enrolled in primary school. This diagram 
clearly depicts that while only about half the enrolled students fall in the official age 
group of five-to-nine years, the interval between five years and fourteen years covers 
most of them. Hence we treated the age between five years and fourteen years as the 
primary school-going age. After 13 cases of those who had already graduated from 
primary schools were deleted, this definition resulted in inclusion of 1201 cases in 
the working sample on which all the needed information was available. 
 
Fig. 1.  Age Distribution of Pupils Enrolled in the Primary Schools of  
Rural Pakistan. 
 
                                                 
of Balochistan has a small proportion of the rural population. 
17For further details of the IFPRI survey, see Alderman and Garcia (1993). 
18See e.g., Khan, et al. (1986). 
↑% of Cases 
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 A list of variables used in this study along with summary statistics is given 
in Table 1. The logit demand function for school enrolment (Equation 9) has a 
dummy dependent variable which takes a value of one if a child is enrolled in a 
primary school and equals zero if she is not. The independent variables in this 
function are discussed below.  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Unit of 
Measurement Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Enrolled in School? 
 
Out-of-Pocket Price of  
   Schooling 
Opportunity Cost of Schooling* 
Total Price of Schooling* 
 
Current Consumption 
Expenditure 
Sex 
 
Yes=1 
No=0 
 
Rupees per year 
Rupees per year 
Rupees per year 
 
 
Rupees per year 
Male=1 
Female=0 
     0.48 
 
 
   324.29 
  2691.51 
  3015.80 
 
 
24817.89 
     0.51 
 
     0.50 
 
 
   384.48 
   595.03 
   724.14 
 
 
 12604.79 
     0.50 
 
–20 
–15 
–10 
–5 
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Age Years      9.23      2.55 
 
TV in the Household? 
 
Father’s Education (Primary  
   School) 
Father’s Education (Middle  
   School or More) 
Electricity Available in the  
   Village? 
District Council Member in the  
   Village? 
Village Served by Public  
   Transport? 
Distance to School 
Yes=1 
Otherwise=0 
Yes=1 
Otherwise=0 
Yes=1 
Otherwise=0 
Yes=1 
Otherwise=0 
Yes=1 
Otherwise=0 
Yes=1 
Otherwise=0 
Kilometres 
     0.11 
 
     0.16 
 
     0.16 
 
 0.60 
 
     0.11 
 
     0.17 
 
     1.48 
     0.31 
 
     0.37 
 
     0.37 
      
0.49 
 
     0.31 
 
     0.38 
 
     2.54 
Number of Observations=1201. 
* Figures based on hours worked equation (see Section IV). 
As discussed earlier, the price of education consists of two parts, namely, out-
of-pocket or direct costs, and opportunity cost. Out-of-pocket costs can readily be 
computed for the school-going children by adding various components such as 
expenditures on books and supplies, tuition, school uniform, and transport. As the 
cost of education for those not enrolled in a school cannot be observed directly, we 
used gender-specific village average cost of schooling for the enrolled children as a 
proxy.19 
To estimate the opportunity cost component of the price variable, data on the 
monetary value of the hours worked by the sampled persons is needed. The IFPRI 
survey provides detailed weekly recall information on main activities of the 
surveyed individuals. Data on the number of hours worked are directly available for 
various non-farm activities such as government, private sector, or self-employment, 
work as a labourer or an artisan, and household work. For other activities such as 
work on own or someone else’s farm, visiting officials, and going to market—which 
once started would normally consume part of the day, any information available on 
any of them was the main activity of the interviewed person, in the morning (a.m. 
hours) and in the afternoon (p.m. hours). Assuming a seven-hour working day, we 
assigned 4.5 work hours whenever such an activity was reported as the main activity 
during the a.m. hours. The same was done for the p.m. hour activities. Hours worked 
per week were computed by adding hours spent in all the activities during the week. 
 
19In some of the villages, no female in the sample was enrolled in a primary school. In such cases, 
we had to use overall village averages rather than gender-specific village averages. 
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The village average hourly wage rate was used to calculate the monetary value of 
these hours. 
Explanatory variables in the hours worked equation, which was used to 
calculate opportunity cost, include the enrolment status dummy, which equals one 
for those attending a school and is zero for non-students, hourly wage rate, non-
labour income, sex, age; and, for those attending school, distance to school as it is 
likely to be negatively related to the number of hours worked. Most of the 
agriculture in the district of Attock depends on rain for irrigation. This feature 
affects almost all aspects of this region’s agriculture. To take care of the possible 
differences in work practices arising from this special condition, a dummy variable 
for Attock was also included. Computation of wage rate has been discussed above. 
A measure of non-labour income was obtained by subtracting farm wage income and 
income from non-farm activities from total income.20 Data on other independent 
variables are directly available. 
Like price, income enters the demand for schooling through the budget 
constraint (Equation 6) as a measure of purchasing power. Current income is not a 
good measure of the long-term purchasing power of a household as it fluctuates 
significantly from period to period. Current consumption expenditure is considered a 
better proxy for the permanent income of the household. Hence we used it in our 
estimation as a measure of household income. 
Other independent variables of demand function for school enrolment enter 
the logit model (Equation 9) through educational production function as components 
of vector X (Equation 2). These include personal characteristics of the school-age 
population as well as characteristics of the household and community in which they 
live. 
To take care of the age and gender profile of the primary school-going age 
population, we included a quadratic for age and a binary variable for sex which 
valued one for males and zero for females. Impact of parents’ education on various 
educational outcomes of their children is well-established in the literature. The 
IFPRI data classify parents’ education into six different levels from not-educated to 
post-secondary. In the logit regressions, a dummy variable for each of these 
categories was tried for both the parents separately, with ‘not-educated’ as the base 
category. 
Using the presence of certain items in a household as a proxy for the existence 
of an environment conducive to education is not uncommon in the literature on 
 
20While the case of farm wage income is straightforward, income from non-farm activities is a 
mixed bag. As most of the non-farm activities involve extensive use of household labour combined with 
relatively small amount of capital, it seems preferable to exclude income from these activities from non-
labour income. 
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educational production function. In Pakistan’s small and relatively isolated village 
communities, TV can potentially influence educational outcomes both by helping 
children through educational programmes and by influencing their parents’ views 
about education.21 Hence a dummy variable for the presence of a TV set in the 
household was added to the list of explanatory variables. 
Variables used in this study to control for community environment and for 
quality of its residents are the presence of public transport, electricity, and a District 
Council member in the village. Availability of public transport has a direct bearing 
on the quality of life in a village as it makes towns, markets, and schools more 
accessible. Electricity saves students from the hassle of literally burning the 
midnight oil and makes possible the use of electric devices. Presence of a district 
council member, an elected local government official, is an indicator of the quality 
of residents in terms of their political awareness and influence as expressed by 
getting a person from their village elected to the local government. Moreover, he is 
likely to get more funds allocated to the schools attended by the children living in his 
village, hence increasing the availability of purchased inputs. 
IV.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
Opportunity Cost 
As noted earlier, opportunity cost of education plays a crucial role in the 
unbiased estimation of the coefficients of the demand function for schooling. 
Still, most of the studies of school enrolment decision of households in 
developing countries either do not include any opportunity cost variables or rely 
on proxies.22 In fact, to the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first 
serious attempt to estimate the opportunity cost of education for Pakistan and to 
analyse its role in the demand for education, hence filling a major gap in 
previous research.  
The importance of this subject calls for a separate study. However, in the 
present context, our objective is limited to estimating the hours worked by the 
students and non-students with a reasonable degree of accuracy and to use these 
estimates in the calculation of the opportunity cost of education. The simple 
average of the hours worked by students and non-students across various 
 
21It may be noted that at the time of the survey only a single channel of public television was 
available in most of Pakistan. The programmes shown on this channel strictly avoided adult content and 
most forms of violence. Hence the possibility of a negative effect of TV on the young mind was virtually 
non-existent. 
22See review by Birdsall (1982). Also see more recent work by Ilon and Moock (1991); Knodel 
and Wongsith (1991); Lloyd and Blanc (1996) and for Pakistan, Alderman, et al. (2001). 
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localities and age groups is found to serve this purpose pretty well.23  
Nonetheless, we opt for a little more sophisticated approach, and estimate a 
regression for hours worked both by students and non-students with enrolment 
status dummy as one of the independent variables. This equation is then used to 
predict the number of hours worked by each individual in the sample in two 
different states, namely, when she is enrolled in a school and when she is not. 
The difference between the number of hours worked in the two states measures 
hours of work foregone due to schooling. This difference is multiplied with wage 
rate to get the opportunity cost of schooling. 
Table 2 presents OLS regression of hours worked per week by students and 
non-students  for  which  relevant  data  were  available.24   Most  of the variables are  
Table 2 
OLS Regression of Hours Worked per Week, by Students and Non-students 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 
Age  
Sex 
(Male=1) 
Log Wage 
Non-labour Income 
(Per-capita) 
Enrolment Status (Enrolled=1) 
Distance×Enrolment Status 
District 
(Attock=1) 
  2.213 
  2.543009 
–16.906002 
 
  6.217824 
 –6.00329×10–4 
 
–10.585178 
 
 –0.636960 
 –6.428624 
  0.268 
  9.668** 
–14.769** 
 
  1.219 
 –3.327** 
 
 –8.287** 
 
 –1.630* 
–4.051** 
R-squared= 0.44 
Number of Observations= 816 
** Significant at 1 percent level. *Significant at 10 percent level. 
 
23See Gertler and Glewwe (1990). 
24Since the sample sizes used for estimating hours worked regression and school enrolment 
regression are different, means of the variables common to the two samples were compared to see how 
similar the two samples were. While most of the figures hence obtained were reasonably close to each 
other, the sample used for estimating the hours worked regression had a significantly higher percentage of 
the individuals who were enrolled in school (56 percent as compared to 48 percent in the sample for 
school enrolment regression). To see how this would affect the results of our analysis, the OLS regression 
was re-estimated with appropriate weights and the entire analysis was done all over again on the basis of 
these results. Many of the coefficients of the school enrolment regression hence obtained remained the 
same, while others showed only a slight change. The resulting estimates of the willingness to pay changed 
just by paisas (pennies). The results of this exercise are available with the author. 
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significant at 1 percent level of significance. Female children and children of older 
age work more hours per week, and those who are enrolled in school work fewer 
hours. Higher non-labour income results in fewer hours worked by the children. The 
dummy variable for the district of Attock is also significant.25 
Distance to school interacted with enrolment status dummy in our 
regression shows that longer distance to school results in fewer hours worked by 
those enrolled in school. It is obvious that distance to school is not relevant for 
the hours worked by non-students. Estimated coefficient of local wage rate has 
the right sign, though it is not as precise as estimates of other coefficients. The 
reason for this appears to be our use of village-level average wage rates in the 
absence of individual-level data.26 
The hours worked regression reported in Table 2 was used to calculate the 
opportunity cost of schooling as described earlier. The resulting opportunity cost 
variable was used in the computation of total price of education, a variable used as 
an independent variable in the demand function for schooling. 
Demand for Schooling 
Several studies of demand for schooling exist for Pakistan that use widely 
diverse data sets and methodologies. Although some of these studies allude to an 
underlying utility function, none of them explicitly derives the demand function for 
schooling from the utility maximisation problem of the decision-maker, Alderman, 
et al. (2001) being the only exception so far. Treatment of the opportunity cost of 
schooling in all these studies is also limited to the use of proxies at best. 
Chishti and Lodhi (1988) study demand for education in the city of Karachi. 
According to their logit analysis, the decision to attend school depends on the gender 
of the potential student, household income, parents’ education, and ethnic 
background. Using data from Pakistan Integrated Household Survey of 1991, Sathar 
and Lloyd (1994) find that boys, children with educated parents, and higher 
household consumption level, and those living in the province of Punjab are more 
likely to attend a primary school. Burney and Irfan (1991,1995) use data from 
Population, Labour Force, and Migration Survey of 1979. In their work, household 
income, father’s education above primary level, his land-tenure status of owner, and 
village literacy rate emerge as significant positive influences on school enrolment of 
 
25Dummies for other districts were dropped from the final regression due to multicolinearity. 
26The role of wage rate here is somewhat indirect, as all children may not work for wage. Still, a 
higher wage rate is likely to induce parents to shift more work from hired labour to their children, or to 
shift some of their own work to the children so that they themselves can work more hours at the 
marketplace. 
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children. They justify their village literacy variable on the basis of Duesenberry 
(imitation) effect rather than as a community variable. 
Alderman, et al. (1996) use the same data set as ours to decompose the gender 
gap in cognitive skills into components attributable to various factors underlying this 
gap. In this process they also estimate probit functions for probability of starting 
school. They consider individuals between the ages of 10 and 25 for whom a school 
was locally available when they were of age to start school. As pointed out earlier, 
most of the students attending primary school fall in the age group of 5 to 14 years. 
Thus the choice of age group is bound to exclude a significant proportion of primary 
school age population. Moreover, many respondents in their sample must have made 
a decision regarding school attendance long ago. Hence explanatory variables such 
as household income and book costs may not necessarily reflect the values of these 
magnitudes at the time of decision. They find out that travel time to school and book 
costs (as a proxy for all out-of-pocket-costs) are important factors that affect the 
decision to start schooling. Other variables that figure in their school attendance 
probits include a measure of household permanent income, father’s attendance of 
middle school, a quadratic in age, and square of a measure of pre-school ability.27 
The study by Alderman, et al. (2001) has been discussed in an earlier section. 
In Table 3 we present estimation results of our logit demand function for primary 
school enrolment. All the variables are significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent 
level with expected signs, most of them at 1 percent level of significance. Price and 
price-income interaction are highly significant, implying that decision-makers respond to 
changes in price and that their response varies with household income. Boys are more 
likely to attend a primary school than girls. As children grow older, their probability of 
enrolment in a primary school first increases, reaches a maximum, and then starts 
declining. Children of educated fathers have a higher chance of school attendance. 
Presence of a television set in the household is positively related to school enrolment. 
Availability of public transport, electricity, and presence of a District Council member in 
a village enhances chances of school attendance for the children living in that village. 
 
Table 3 
Logit Regression of Demand for Primary School Enrolment 
Variable Coefficient Wald Statistic 
Constant 
Price 
 –8.681 
 –0.0004866 
 66.272*** 
 14.995*** 
 
27The measure of pre-school ability used in their study gave rise to some controversy. For 
competing arguments in this debate, see Khan (1993) and Alderman, et al. (1996). Alderman, et al. ran 
their regressions without this measure as well and concluded that the results “do not change qualitatively if 
we eliminate this variable from our analysis”. 
Willingness to Pay for Primary Education 43 
Price-income Interaction 
Sex (Male=1) 
Age 
Age Squared 
TV in the Household? (Yes=1) 
Father Educated/Primary School? (Yes=1) 
Father Educated/Middle School or More? (Yes=1) 
 –3.386×10–9 
  1.105 
  1.838 
 –0.096 
  0.493 
  0.417 
  0.976 
 11.925*** 
 64.041*** 
 76.043*** 
 78.017***  
  3.691* 
 5.299*** 
  21.991*** 
District Council Member in Village? (Yes=1) 
Village Served by Public Transport? (Yes=1) 
Electricity Available in Village? (Yes=1) 
0.403 
 0.532 
 0.699 
 3.243* 
  7.143*** 
 17.239*** 
– 2 Log Likelihood= 1327.03 
Chi-square= 335.75 
Number of Observations= 1201 
*** Significant at 1 percent level or less.  
    * Significant at 10 percent level or less. 
 
The rationale for inclusion of these variables in the demand function for 
schooling was discussed earlier. However, some of the results reported above need 
more elaboration. In the initial regressions, all levels of father’s education turned out 
to be significant. A likelihood ratio test could not reject at 1 percent level of 
significance the hypothesis that the coefficients of the dummy variables for higher 
than primary levels of father’s education were equal. Hence, in the final regression, 
these coefficients were constrained to be equal. This amounts to including a single 
dummy variable for father’s higher than primary education.  
The number of educated mothers is very small in our sample, reflecting an 
extremely low level of female education in rural Pakistan about two decades ago, 
when these women were school-going age.28 Most of them were married to educated 
men, hence confounding the influence of father and mother’s education. In addition, 
children of most of the educated women were attending school. These factors made 
it impossible to obtain a reliable measure of the effect of mother’s education on 
child’s school enrolment.29 
The dummy variable for the presence of a Union Council member in the 
village, an elected local government official, was found to be significant. It is 
interesting to note that when a similar dummy variable for a non-elected government 
official was included in the regression, it was not significant at conventional levels 
of significance. This adds some weight to the view that the role of elected 
representatives in public decision-making should be strengthened. A detailed 
analysis of this issue, however, is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
2896 percent women in our sample are illiterate. 
29Similar reasoning led Alderman, et al. (1996), who used the same data as ours, to exclude 
mother’s education from their school attendance equations. 
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V.  PRICE ELASTICITIES AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
A few words about the method used for calculating price elasticities and 
willingness to pay are in order here. The average value of a non-linear function over a 
range of data is generally not equal to the value of that function evaluated at the 
average of the data. In case of logistic regression, elasticity and willingness to pay are 
non-linear functions of the independent variables. Hence, if these functions are 
evaluated at the average values of the independent variables, the resulting estimates 
may not truly represent their average value. Train’s (1986) sample enumeration method 
was employed to overcome this problem. This method amounts to calculating value of 
the function for each individual separately for the relevant values of the variable under 
consideration (such as price in case of price elasticity) while keeping all other variables 
at their observed value for that individual, and then averaging the resulting estimates of 
the function over all individuals. 
 
Income Group-specific Price Elasticities 
Table 4 reports estimates of price elasticity of demand for primary school 
enrolment across income quintiles and over a price range that varies from Rs 150 to 
Rs 400 with the increments of Rs 50. This price range covers most of the cases in  
our sample.30  We also report average price elasticity for each price range over all 
values of income to give an idea how a single estimate of elasticity would conceal its 
actual variation with income. 
Table 4 
Price Elasticity of Demand for School Enrolment across Income Quintiles 
Price Range 
Income Quintiles 
Rs 150 
to 
Rs 200 
Rs 200 
to 
Rs 250 
Rs 250 
to 
Rs 300 
Rs 300 
to 
Rs 350 
Rs 350 
to 
Rs 400 
1 (Poorest 20%) 
2 
3 
4 
5 (Richest 20%) 
Mean 
0.41 
0.34 
0.30 
0.21 
0.11 
0.27 
0.60 
0.50 
0.43 
0.30 
0.16 
0.40 
0.81 
0.67 
0.59 
0.41 
0.22 
0.54 
1.04 
0.87 
0.77 
0.54 
0.29 
0.70 
1.29 
1.09 
0.96 
0.68 
0.36 
0.88 
 
 
30Only 1.7 percent cases lie outside these limits and are scattered over a wide range. 
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The general outlook that emerges from Table 4 is that the price elasticity of 
demand for primary school enrolment in rural Pakistan is high; yet it is less than 
unity in most of the cases. A glance across the rows and columns of the table shows 
that it is the highest for the poorest people and for the highest range of price. As we 
move from the higher to the lower income quintiles, price elasticity increases. This 
pattern indicates that making education more expensive by introducing user charges 
is likely to result in a significant decline in primary school enrolment, particularly 
for the poorest segment of the population. The absolute value of price elasticity is 
greater than unity for the poorest 40 percent people in the highest range of price and 
for the poorest 20 percent people in the second-highest price range. This implies that 
an increase in the price of schooling for these groups will result in a reduction both 
in revenues and enrolment. 
Nonetheless, a closer look at these elasticities reveals that opportunity for 
revenue generation without drastically reducing school enrolment still exists. At least 
for the richest 20 percent of the population, and especially for the lower ranges of price, 
elasticities are quite moderate. Keeping in mind that children belonging to richer 
households face relatively lower opportunity cost of education as they are expected to 
work fewer hours, one can safely conclude that charging tuition fees from the students 
coming from the richest of the households would not result in substantial reduction in 
school enrolment.31 Developing an administrative mechanism for such a policy of 
‘reverse discrimination’, though, may not be an easy task. 
The Willingness to Pay for Education 
Income group-specific price elasticities give important insights into the 
implications of replacing a school system based on free education with a price-based 
regime. However, as was observed earlier, this approach does not take into account 
the possibility of investing the revenues generated by tuition fees back into 
education, a vital component of virtually every proposal for a user fee programme. 
This shortcoming can be taken care of by estimating the willingness to pay for 
education. 
The estimates of willingness to pay reported in Table 5 are obtained by 
applying the methodology developed in Section II. These estimates measure the 
amount of money a child’s household would be willing to pay if a primary school is 
made available next door for her education. We consider three scenarios for these 
calculations, namely, when the school is initially one kilometre, two kilometres, and 
three kilometres away from the household, and find out how much money would be 
paid if this distance were eliminated. 
 
 
31See our estimated regression of hours worked by school-age children reported in Table 2 and 
discussed in the previous section. 
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Table 5 
Willingness to Pay for Primary School Education in  
Rural Pakistan  (Rs per Month) 
 Distance to School 
Income Quintile 1 Kilometre 2 Kilometres 3 Kilometres 
1 (Poorest 20%) 
2 
3 
4 
5 (Richest 20%) 
Mean 
  4.36 
  5.24 
  5.66 
  6.94 
  8.44 
  6.13 
  8.56 
 10.33 
 11.19 
 13.78 
 16.76 
 12.12 
 12.60 
 15.28 
 16.58 
 20.50 
 24.97 
 17.98 
 
It is clear from Table 5 that richer people and those who live farther away 
from an existing school are willing to pay more for having a nearby school. The 
figures are relatively small and apparently there is no way this money can pay for the 
fixed costs of building a school, which is normally of the order of at least tens of 
thousands of rupees. However, it would be interesting to find out if this amount 
would be enough to cover running costs of a primary school. 
Let us assume for illustrative purposes that, as reported by Khan, et al. 
(1986a), an average monthly tuition fee of Rs 20 per student was needed to recover 
all the recurring expenditure of primary education. Then it can be seen from Table 5 
that only the richest 40 percent people living three kilometres or farther away from a 
school would be willing to pay enough to recover all current expenditures on their 
schooling. Those living closer to a school, whether rich or poor, would not pay 
enough for this purpose. These figures tell us that if there are enough students in a 
locality to warrant construction of a new school, if the nearest school available at 
present is three or more kilometres away, if all these students belong to the richest 40 
percent of the households, and finally, if a school is constructed in the vicinity, all 
the running expenditures of that school will be recovered by charging every student 
a tuition fee equal to the willingness of her household to pay for her education. 
According to Table 5, the smallest amount of money is offered by the 
poorest 20 percent households located at a distance of one kilometre from school. 
Undoubtedly, Rs 4.36 is a meagre sum of money. Nevertheless, if every student 
is required to pay this money as tuition, it would still be enough to cover more 
than 20 percent of recurrent expenditure of primary education according to the 
estimate of per-student primary school current expenditures cited above. Using 
this same estimate and the last row of Table 5, it can be shown that if tuition is 
charged in accordance with parents’ willingness to pay, the resulting resources 
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will be enough to cover 31 percent of running expenditures of a primary school 
from those who live one kilometre away from school, 61 percent from those 
living two kilometres away, and 90 percent from those who are three kilometres 
away from a school. 
In addition to the simulations for different values of school distance 
reported in Table 5, we also calculated willingness to pay for a school just next 
door if the initial distance was that observed in our sample. This takes into 
account the fact that many people already have a school in close proximity to their 
homes, and for many others, the school is less than one kilometre away. The 
resulting estimate of the average willingness to pay was Rs 6.48. If this amount is 
charged from every student as tuition, according to the criterion used in the above 
analysis it would cover more than 32 percent of running expenditures of a school. 
If we keep in mind that current primary school system in most of rural Pakistan is 
almost 100 percent subsidised and severely resource-deficient, and if we also 
appreciate the fact that charging tuition according to the willingness to pay would 
not reduce school enrolment, this would look like an achievement. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The detailed estimates of the willingness to pay for primary education in rural 
Pakistan presented in this study are based on a rigorously defined theoretical model of 
the utility-maximising behaviour of the consumer. Unlike the previous studies, the 
demand function for primary school enrolment estimated for this purpose incorporates 
total price of education, including opportunity cost. The empirical specification of the 
utility function, from which this demand function has been derived, allows for 
estimating income group-specific price elasticities for school enrolment.  
At an empirical level, the role of community variables in the demand for 
education has been explored in far more detail than the previous studies. Moreover, 
since we have estimated an ‘hours worked’ equation for the school-age population to 
estimate the opportunity cost of education, we have been able to find a significant 
negative relationship between non-labour income and hours worked. This finding 
provides empirical support to a previously untested though commonly held belief 
that children from poorer households face a higher opportunity cost of education. 
Our estimates of income group-specific price elasticities show that reduction 
in school enrolment resulting from the introduction of user fees for education at 
primary level will be most pronounced for the poorest segments of population. These 
results also indicate the income classes for which this effect will be relatively mild, 
making it possible to generate at least some revenue through user charges while 
leaving school enrolment virtually unaffected. 
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The estimates of willingness to pay for primary education reported in this 
study demonstrate that this willingness is generally very low in rural Pakistan as 
compared to the cost of building and operating a school. However, a fraction of the 
expenditures necessary to run a school can be covered by adopting carefully 
conceived and planned policies of tapping into this paying potential. Such a policy 
shift would be an improvement over the system of free education in terms of cost 
recovery. Nevertheless, the resources hence generated would be far from enough to 
run a self-sufficient school system. 
The main result that emerges from these estimates of price elasticities and 
willingness-to-pay is that parents in rural Pakistan, where the majority of Pakistan’s 
population lives, can be made to contribute only a small fraction of the cost of their 
children’s education. Most of the resources needed for this purpose will have to be 
generated from other sources, such as government and donors. A detailed 
exploration of these possibilities, however, is beyond the scope of this study. 
Certain caveats should also be kept in mind while interpreting our estimates of 
willingness to pay. These estimates do not take into account certain factors that can 
possibly motivate people to pay for a school even though they may not have school-age 
children. For example, there might have been some people in the sample who did not 
have school-age children at the time of the survey but would be willing to pay for a 
nearby school to ensure its existence at a future time when they would need it. Some 
people might have been willing to pay for just having the pleasure of a neighbourhood 
school, while still others would pay to have a school built for the coming generations.32 
Hence it would be more realistic to consider the figures reported in this study as 
providing a lower bound to the actual willingness to pay for education. 
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